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Perceived Problems with Foe’s Critical Oeuvre
Over the last thirty-odd years the white South-African writer J.M. Coetzee has grown into a canonical figure, his novels, in particular, forming the subject of numerous critical essays produced in the (Western) academy. It will come as no surprise, then, that one comes across the following remark in one such essay: “…J. M. Coetzee is a writer particularly suited to the preoccupations of contemporary academic discourse” (MacLeod 1). If one did a little brainstorming about this phrase it might just follow that his work could be expected to be easily interpretable. Lewis Macleod, from whose context I tore this particular phrase, probably hits the nail on the head. However, in the case of Foe (1986), he all but asserts that many of the critical readings which together make up the critical oeuvre about the novel are basically too easy. This may come as something of a shock, as indeed it should. It seems that what (pre-)occupies the academic, who we may provisionally identify as the post-colonial critic, has led him or her to overdetermine the main thematic issues of Coetzee’s novel. But if the critical findings are apt and cut to the core of Coetzee’s work, we may conversely say that the academy has arrived at a critical consensus in its treatment of Foe.
However, surprisingly so, in his article “’Do We of Necessity Become Puppets in a Story?’ or Narrating the World: On Speech, Silence, and Discourse in J.M. Coetzee’s Foe,” Macleod finds some serious flaws in the body of critical work that has been published over the twenty-odd years since Foe first saw the light of day. In fact, the consensus itself appears to be flawed because the discursive or theoretically narrative frameworks that have generally been applied were often too rigid, forcing interpretations of the novel into a critical structure which leaves no room for implications and meaning which, Macleod has reason to believe, may also be there: “Bluntly, I would like to suggest that the Foe’s critical oeuvre (sic) inadvertently duplicates the processes of discursive mystification the novel seems to critique, that the critical frameworks applied to the novel (operating as specific discursive structures) might lead us further from, not closer to, the truth” (2). Macleod has, as far as he can tell, read every article, essay and book this oeuvre consists of and if he is right then not only would a re-evaluation of this body be in order, but his findings would then also necessitate new queries towards this, hitherto unknown, truth he speaks off. What this truth might look like is something that Macleod only circumscribes generally and while the notion of ‘truth’ is problematic in itself, the task of “getting somebody to read it” (i.e. Barton’s role and, more pressingly, Friday’s) according to new “idiosyncratic terms” is “nearly impossible” (14).
I will myself look at a number of the writers who have occupied themselves with Coetzee’s novel, picking what I think are the most important ones, most of whom have naturally been briefly mentioned and criticized by Macleod as well. But for now it will suffice to explain what are the two main points of interest that have been questioned anew.
In this quite recent article Macleod investigates the critical representations of, or critical reactions to, the characters of Susan Barton and Friday and, as I have said, finds serious problems in the outcome. He asserts that the main issue Coetzee has tried to resolve is that of narrative, or more broadly speaking, discursive power and “(M)ore directly, Foe asks if discursive constructions bring us closer to understanding things as they really are, or if discursive frameworks simply reinforce themselves, creating a wholly discursive world that mystifies rather than enlightens us” (2). The latter seems to be the case. Nearly all of Foe’s critics have reinforced their own suppositions; that is, those that they have brought to the novel. Rather than recognizing that “narrative power or narrative skill” (2) is the pivotal force at work here, the critics have subsumed this under the larger heading of postcolonial and feminist discourse and power (I would like to add that indeed the noun “story” is the one word that seems to occur most frequently in the novel, which word, on the poststructuralist basis that both Coetzee and Macleod seem to operate from, may as well be equated to narrative). They have, that is, interpreted the novel along the not so closely circumscribing lines of conventional power to do with politics and gender, blurring the edges of a story which is more focused than these findings account for.
In the case of Susan Barton many critics have too readily depicted her as a victim where, upon closer reading, it is possible to find some serious inconsistency in her behaviour and the decisions she makes. To an extent, this causes for her to compromise her own position. Barton’s attempts to appropriate Cruso’s story, which later on in the novel are mirrored in Foe’s attempts to appropriate her story in turn, compromise Barton’s position as well as that of the critic who labels her a victim of “hegemonic masculinity.” As Macleod has it: “There is a persistent and, I think, off-target effort to view Susan as some kind of truth-seeking, marginalized quest figure who is victimized by oppressive structures, while simultaneously viewing Cruso and Foe as agents of patriarchal control” (3).
In the second case, that of Friday, something of even greater interest appears to have been at play. All of the interpretations of this important figure have been misguided by the one supposition of Friday’s loss of his tongue. Because definitive evidence of Friday being tongueless does simply not exist in the novel and because this assumption has never been checked this particular fiction has turned to fact in a rather unexpected way. Macleod cites Thomas Pavel in the respect that here one can see exemplified just how a fiction, a legend perhaps, has become “ontologically self-sufficient” (9).
Now, given the fact that Friday’s lack of his tongue is completely unsure, Macleod proposes a different start for reading this character: “Still, I would suggest that these assumptions are faulty ones, derived not from Friday’s body (which remains undiscovered) but from the pulse of external critical discourses. More to the point, I think it’s possible to suppose Friday possesses a tongue and consequently to read Friday’s silence as a voluntary act, to think Friday has the capacity, just not the inclination, for speech” (7). The “pulse” Macleod mentions, is a figure of speech he borrows from Nadine Gordimer, who uses it in her preface to Graham Huggan and Stephen Watson’s book on Coetzee. It symbolizes a resignation to the (dis-)course or flow of a book one reads, when the reader is subject to the discursive frameworks and the very thinking that went into that writing to overwhelm the reader (Gordimer xi). Although this “loss of agency” (2) is not the necessary, unavoidable result of every reading practise when different views allow for narrative to be a tool to shape and understand the world one is in, Macleod uses the symbol to explain how many critics of Foe have almost unconsciously subjected themselves to this unsustainable reading of Friday. This is a case of reproduction and perpetuation, I would say, where in a poststructuralist sense overriding (post-colonial) “templates” have induced the critic to take Friday’s tonguelessness for a fact, whereby the critic moves himself into a position where he/she can somewhat safely say whatever these templates dictate. It is a case where Lyotard’s notion of the ‘grand narrative’ comes in, as Macleod points out, and the discursive power emanating from such a story subsumes the specificity of any situation under its own body of work. The specificity of Susan Barton’s situation then, appears to be less innocent while that of Friday may be completely idiosyncratic. If Coetzee intended to warn against this mechanism, then, Macleod seems to say, it seems that hardly anyone took heed.
Quite recently, then, accepted notions surrounding Coetzee’s Foe have been thrown into something of disarray. Macleod suggests it is perhaps best not to want to explain Friday away according to some pre-existing thought pattern which cannot logically apply to someone wholly idiosyncratic who is, perhaps rather than Coetzee’s Cruso, the truly “singular” man (Foe 11). What this seems to suggest, as Macleod indeed does, is that Friday’s singularity presents the Western academic with a figure so completely unknown, dancing, ‘writing’ and ‘being’ after a fashion never seen before, that he or she simply lacks the frame of reference to learn anything about him. One should try nevertheless. The first step that needs to be taken, however, is a re-evaluation of the work done so far. Of course, much of what has been said up to this point is of great value so that it is perhaps more accurate to assert that the most important issues that have so far been resolved into a consensus need a slight adjustment of some sort. I will therefore look into those aspects of post-colonial and postmodern theory that have generally been applied and will, with reference to Macleod’s article, more thoroughly investigate where these may have missed the point (In addition, I will briefly look into the possibility that Coetzee’s warning is inside the text of Foe, that the novel is in fact an implicit allegory of ideas). The nuance that I will look for, incidentally, is a matter of degree. That is, the degree to which typical templates of post-colonial and feminist thinking override the specificity of the novel is the degree to which “the specificity of the conflicts between Susan and Cruso, and Susan and Foe get lost in the grand narrative of feminist discourse,” and the degree to which “Friday’s position has been habitually overwhelmed by the demands of the larger (and less-nuanced) narrative of a postcolonial discourse that ‘purports to subsume a multiplicity of events and perspectives into the orbit of its own theory’” (6).
In this way I will indebt myself, of course, wholly to Macleod. But his argument is highly combative in that it challenges nearly all of the critical work that has so far been published on Foe. It seems the sensible thing to do then, to listen to this strong appeal and to try and take up the work which he stipulates needs to be done. I will therefore look into readings both of the characters of Barton and Friday at separate stages (chapters one and two, respectively), to see whether these should be taken to be victimized figures or not. As it turns out, matters are not all that clear-cut; to a certain degree Barton shows herself to be complicit while Friday is a figure who may be said to reside quite beyond the novel proper. 

Chapter 1  Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe and Coetzee’s Foe
A Post-colonialist Reading of Robinson Crusoe 
The most conspicuous element of Foe, besides its overt meta-fictional quality, is its elaborate reference to Robinson Crusoe (1719). To understand what Foe conveys one will have to come to terms with this old novel anew. Indeed, part of what Coetzee asks us to do, I think, is to rethink one’s position on Robinson Crusoe. In what follows I will therefore present a working interpretation of Robinson Crusoe, focusing on its colonialist aspects while leaving out such elements as the issue of realism and that of the Puritan or spiritual autobiography (cf. Richetti xvi, xix).
Although the intertext of Robinson Crusoe is most conspicuous within the text of Foe there is of course the additional reference to Daniel Defoe’s later work Roxana (1724), of which I will have something to say at a later instance.
It is perhaps no surprise that, well after the appearance of Foe, Coetzee himself expressed a few opinions on Defoe’s novel when he published a short essay as an introduction to the 1999 World’s Classics edition of Robinson Crusoe. Naturally he subscribes to many of the commonly accepted ideas the critic nowadays entertains about the important character Robinson Crusoe. John Richetti, in one such other introduction to a Penguin edition, cites James Joyce for instance, who supposedly was a great admirer of Defoe and who “called Crusoe the embodiment of British imperialism,” and “the true prototype of the British colonist, as Friday (..) is the symbol of the subject races” (Richetti xxviii). Robinson Crusoe, as Coetzee himself puts it, “has become a figure in the collective consciousness of the West” and “finds himself in the sphere of myth” (Coetzee 20). Briefly discussing the supposed realism of the novel, which he feels is a problematic label to affix, for it only applies to its empiricist aspect which is but one tenet of the realist novel, he moves on to touch upon such core elements as punishment, repentance and deliverance. 
Indeed, I would like to add that the theme of providence is central to the novel for it is the light in which Crusoe himself, in retrospect, chooses to cast his story, thus motivating what has moved as well as befallen him (consider the opening passages where Crusoe already hints at impending disaster (“affliction”) if he is to disregard his father’s advice). The very emblematic nature of Crusoe’s adventure, moreover, the didacticism already stressed in the preface, is not necessarily what has made it into a myth, but it does ultimately centralize the providential theme. Incidentally, we can conveniently take the traditional merits of Robinson Crusoe for granted. Foremost the fact, a widely accepted given at least, that it is the first novel in English literature, a standard set, so to speak, for long prose works, which standard one might further want to define by way of such iconic works as Pamela (1740 – 41), Tom Jones (1749) and Tristram Shandy (1759).​[1]​ The question that is relevant here is, bluntly put, what is wrong with Robinson Crusoe? And why did Coetzee take it up and rewrite it, adapt it and indeed, appropriate it? In his essay he is straightforward about the darker meanings of the novel when he writes:
Crusoe does not, of course, abandon ‘his’ island when, along with Friday, he is rescued. He leaves it peopled with mutineers and castaways; though he returns to England, he cannily retains a foothold in the colony he has thus founded. Robinson Crusoe is unabashed propaganda for the extension of British mercantile power in the New World and the establishment of new British colonies. As for the native peoples of the Americas and the obstacle they represent, all one need say is that Defoe chooses to represent them as cannibals. The treatment Crusoe metes out to them is accordingly savage. (Coetzee, Daniel Defoe 24) 
Robinson Crusoe, we are to believe, is a colonialist novel through and through. However, rather than outright propaganda it is probably more accurate to say that the colonialist layer of the book is first and foremost a sign of its time, rather like Defoe’s motive for profit in part signals the birth of the commercial book business, assuming that Defoe aimed at giving his audience what it wanted at that time. Or to put it another way, living in an early imperialistic, enterprising time presented Defoe with an opportunity to write an “adventure tale”, which over time has proven to be the most persistently appealing feature of the book. Another factor is that the story was probably inspired by the real adventure of one Alexander Selkirk ​[2]​, so that, rather than propagating an ideological stance, working out this real event into (economically viable) fiction may well have been another prime incentive for Defoe to write his novel. 
In any case, Defoe was quick to capitalize on its success, publishing the first of two sequels within the same year, which strategy almost reminds one of Hollywood’s marketing schemes when it comes to milking a formula which has proven its worth. As John Richetti also points out: “Robinson Crusoe is first and foremost a response to commercial possibilities and opportunities in the early-eighteenth-century publishing market, Defoe’s effort to give the public what he thought they would buy” (Richetti xiii). 
These remarks should serve as a reminder that Defoe did not with this book personally and deliberately wish to promote British mercantile and colonial efforts. In the first analysis, him being a prolific and versatile writer, one should say that he simply tried his hand at something else. At the same time, however, in the last analysis, these reservations do remind one of the fact that the novel, once it was out in the public domain, would and could grow into something more widely significant than the narrow scope of its plot would initially have suggested. James Joyce recognized this as well when he said that “Whoever rereads this simple, moving book in the light of subsequent history cannot help but fall under its prophetic spell” (qtd. in F. Ellis 15), thus reading it as an anticipation of the colonial history which was to ensue. This citation gives Frank Ellis occasion to remind one that “a work of literature is an open system – open, that is, to the effects of what happens outside it” (15). Of course, conversely, one needs to be careful not to understate the colonialist aspects of the book, for there is much of that in there. But it is important also to recognize how the novel came to be all but separated from its historical creator to grow into something much wider in significance and, in effect, emblematic, due to social and historical processes which enforced a colonialist reading. In fact, Robinson Crusoe has come to be seen as a paradigmatic text of colonial experience, according to Elleke Boehmer, who can only say so after surveying a large number of texts and identifying a number of recurrent motifs, metaphors and themes which then turn out to be defining traits of colonialist literature. It is thus that she notes how “To name a foreign land, to make of that land and its ways a textual artefact, was to exercise mastery,” and thus we in turn begin to see how Robinson Crusoe came to be situated inside a whole tradition (19).   
In summary, the above is to say that the significance (literary, cultural and political) of Defoe’s book rests upon a two-way process, which premiss, not coincidentally, is also central to Markman Ellis’ discussion of cannibalism, or anthropophagy, in both Robinson Crusoe and one subsequent adaptation or Robinsonade. Departing from Edward Said’s idea of the novel as implicated in the imperial project (the novel creatively colonizing space) he states that: “If one is to take seriously Said’s suggestion that Robinson Crusoe is not only enabled by, but also enables, an ideology of overseas expansion then we ought to be able to see Robinson Crusoe being applied in colonial situations, at the moment of imperialism, so to speak” (M. Ellis 50). 
Western accounts of cannibalism date as far back as the writings of Herodotus but this custom was still a matter of dispute with regard to the New Zealand Maori population encountered by the famous James Cook in the early 1770s. As it turned out, whether or not the Maori were in actual fact cannibals Cook and his accompanying scientific observers could never definitively ascertain.​[3]​ What is of overriding importance, however, is that this to the Europeans disconcerting and alien cultural trait was nevertheless taken for a fact, also, in this instance,  by the anonymous writer of The Travels of Hildebrand Bowman. First published in 1778, the writer draws extensively on the particulars of Cook’s second expedition to the Fiji Islands, but at the same time the book’s long first chapter bears a close resemblance to Defoe’s novel and, in Ellis’ conclusion: “The Crusoe narrative is a felicitous model, then, not only because of the castaway theme, but because it was a central text in the eighteenth-century British discourse on cannibalism” (57). The point is that here Robinson Crusoe did indeed serve as a paradigm for reading another culture and its practises, the text having been adopted as a model imperial discourse which benefited a hierarchic positioning of the contact cultures. Just as Cook’s reports resulted in “an official confirmation of the inhumanity of the colonial subject,” so does Bowman present us with an instance where this “fact” was taken together with the Crusoe text to enforce and perpetuate this hegemonic discourse on cannibalism (53). 
But we still need to work out how the European reading of a supposedly savage cultural practise could be used in the formation of colonial discourse in general. The work of Peter Hulme is important here, as Ellis is well aware, for he (i.e. Hulme) has shown that the discourse on savagery (and cannibalism) “was hegemonic in the sense that it provided a popular vocabulary for constituting ‘otherness’” (qtd. In M. Ellis 46). What is important is that, again, just as Cook’s reports were circumstantial, actual instances of cannibalism need not even necessarily be observed for colonists to justify their bid for property and power. Images of cannibalism circulated through texts like Robinson Crusoe and Bowman and had actually been, in various forms, in circulation for a long time before that, and thus, on a literary level alone, the process of ‘othering’ and, indeed, degrading foreign cultures was already possible. Ania Loomba, who has also surveyed studies of this process, also cites Hulme when she recounts his finding that (in this the case of the Spaniards in the Caribbean) “the idea of anthropophagy was directly applied to justify brutal colonialist practises” (qtd. in Loomba 59). This ideological image-building also worked on an etymological level. For the word ‘Carib’, a member of the Caribbean people, was transformed to ‘cannibal’ which word also became synonymous with anthropophagy, thus adding to the vocabulary and, by extension, stock of images with which to affix labels to foreign individuals and cultures. What we have here, therefore, is a case in point of how “language and literature are together implicated in constructing the binary of a European self and a non-European other, which, as Said’s Orientalism suggested, is a part of the creation of colonial authority” (Loomba 73).    
To return for a moment to Frank Ellis’ notion of the novel as an “open system” we can now see that Robinson Crusoe, over the course of its history of reception, to a great extent aided and informed the ideological perception and literary construction of the colonial other as an inferior and savage creature. Incidentally, as we will see at a later point, the fact that the novel is an “open system” (with reference to Boehmer, we may in addition call it paradigmatic), in the case of Robinson Crusoe containing the emblems for many of the motifs commonly found in colonialist discourse, is also why its status as a prominent member of the English literary canon is reconsidered in Foe. Still, the emblem of the cannibal encounter, although invested with major implications, must in Robinson Crusoe be subsumed under the encompassing theme of providence, for herein lies the ultimate legitimation of cultural authority and supremacy.
As I have already indicated, Elleke Boehmer systematically surveys many textual artefacts from colonial (as well as post-colonial) times. She proposes the following definition of colonialist discourse:
Colonialist discourse can be taken to refer to that collection of symbolic practises, including textual codes and conventions and implied meanings, which Europe deployed in the process of its colonial expansion and, in particular, in understanding the bizarre and apparently untranslatable strangeness with which it came into contact. Involving an expression of mastery, but also wonder, bewilderment and fear. This discourse embraced a set of ideological approaches. (Boehmer 48)
To be sure, expressions both of mastery as well as bewilderment and fear are Crusoe’s too. If we then consider Loomba’s definition of ideology as “all our mental frameworks, our beliefs, concepts, and ways of expressing our relationship to the world,” we begin to understand why the theme of providence is central to the novel (25). Of course, as we have seen, the concept of anthropophagy was one such ideological concept which was used during times of colonial expansion, but Robinson Crusoe is first and foremost a castaway, estranged, at first, for his deliverance unto his island, which then incites him to make sense of his situation. John Richetti calls Crusoe a “modern figure” who “in the midst of randomness and in the face of what looks like an arbitrary set of circumstances (..) struggles and creates personal and satisfying order” (xviii). Crusoe’s could thus even be seen as an existential plight which in part recalls Boehmer’s notion of the generally unknowable surroundings the colonist found himself in or, what she calls, “the resistant incomprehensibility or unreadability of the colonized beyond” (58). Apart from the fact that Crusoe’s fear and bewilderment are thus congruent with Boehmer’s theory, the real interest lies in what he makes of it. 
Crusoe more than once refers to the island as a prison, and Frank Ellis therefore reads his situation as follows: “Robinson Crusoe’s ‘captivity’ was primarily theological and only incidentally geographical. Or to put it another way: Robinson Crusoe’s solitary confinement to the island is the vehicle of a metaphor of which the tenor is his captivity in sin” (Ellis 17). In this light, and despite the fact that it seems obvious, it is important to remember that Crusoe’ s shipwreck is the central event in the plot. It stages the drama in such a way that it forcefully brings out Crusoe’s religious disposition. Had things turned out otherwise we might imagine the possibility Crusoe at one point also entertains, namely that “had that Providence, which so happily had seated me at the Brasils, as a planter, bless’d me with confin’d desires ... I might have been by this time, I mean, in the time of my being in this island, one of the most considerable planters in the Brasils ... ” (Robinson Crusoe 154). But because of what he calls his “ORIGINAL SIN,”  that is, turning down his father’s advice and entertaining immoderate desires, he is left to dwell alone on his island and is thrown back unto himself (154). 
That Crusoe then comes to see his ordeal in a religious light has to do with all the small things that befall him, such as, early on in the island episode, the seemingly miraculous springing up of barley in the shade of the rock where he has fixed his dwelling (63). It is one of many instances which show that, to Crusoe, “God is in the details.”​[4]​ This incident is exemplary for what Crusoe makes of nearly everything, seeing the hand of providence at work when, prior to his religious conversion, he despairingly wonders “that it could hardly be rational to be thankful for such a life” (51). Overall one can see that what encompasses all the minutiae of Crusoe’s life is his deliverance from sin: “as complex and particularized as the events of his life are, they are shaped eventually in his mind by the master narrative of Christian Salvation” (Richetti xix).    
Robinson Crusoe, then, is a book about one man’s awakening from religious ignorance and indifference. But as I stated earlier, the book is also an adventure tale so that in actual fact one may very well say that Robinson Crusoe wants to teach and delight. This classic object is already made explicit in the preface, i.e. the story that is to follow is applied “to the instruction of others by this example, and to justify and honour the wisdom of Providence in all the variety of our circumstances, let them happen how they will” (Robinson Crusoe 3). Again, what follows is essentially the story of one man alone, retrospectively set in such a way as to bring out this theme. Just how this works one can see by means of the following passage: 
And I add this part here, to hint to whoever shall read it, that whenever they come to a true sense of things, they will find deliverance from sin a much greater blessing than deliverance from affliction. 
But leaving this part I return to my journal. (Robinson Crusoe 78) 
These sentences are interesting for three reasons. They belong to one of many of Crusoe’s testimonies to the providential nature of his trial, leading to (in retrospect) his true return to Christianity, or religious coming of age, and the acknowledgement of Jesus Christ as his saviour. This passage begins on page 70 when, having been violently ill, he has an epiphanic dream. In this dream some demigod manifests himself and Crusoe, having thus far lacked repentance, is told he will now die. This vision brings on Crusoe’s conversion. Secondly, the passage explicitly delivers what the preface had promised the story would present the reader with, that is, it is one of the instances where the emblematic or didactic function of Crusoe’s autobiographical account is brought to the fore. Note that Crusoe does not “hint” in the present-day sense of the word but openly states he believes that he has come to “a true sense of things” now that he has come to see his predicament in a religious light.​[5]​ Lastly, it is a self-reflexive instance, one of the moments where Crusoe lets it be known that this is a retrospective account, set in order, partly in the shape of a journal and overall written with a particular focus. Of course, this last feature may be subsumed with the didacticism of the providential theme, but it concisely illustrates just how Crusoe set his story to bring out precisely this pivotal theme. Incidentally, Richetti, when commenting on the retrospective nature of Robinson Crusoe, feels that it is only at the time when Crusoe looks back that he has “acquired the proper sense of divine or providential arrangement in human affairs” (xvi). So, during his time on the island this realization only grows on him, most illuminatingly so during the passage from page 70 onwards. In effect, just as Richetti calls the retrospective perspective the “crucial narrative feature of Robinson Crusoe,”  the religious development of Defoe’s character is what is central to the novel (xvi).
The providential nature of Crusoe’s hardships, then, is reflected in everything he sees, feels, thinks and does. It is therefore, for instance, that one can conclude that Crusoe feels he has a God-given right to the island. For it is there, amidst the initially random but eventually providential order of things that he is to live and better his life. And indeed it is thus that he comes to see himself as the rightful owner of the island: “I descended a little on the side of that delicious vale, surveying it with a kind of pleasure, (tho’ mixt with my other afflicting thoughts) to think that this was all my own, that I was king and lord of all this country indefeasibly, and had a right of possession; and if I could convey it, I might have it in inheritance, as completely as any lord of a manor in England” (Robinson Crusoe 80).
Coetzee, in the short essay I started this discussion with, only briefly touches upon the central theme of providence: “Friday’s self-evident goodness of heart does prompt Crusoe to reflect on the relevance of Christian doctrine to the Americas, and hence on the rationale that Western colonialism offered for its activities there: the spreading of the gospel” (25). In addition he warns against the notion Crusoe also entertains but does not develop, that of polygenesis: that is, if one assumes that the peoples of the New World came from a separate “stock” and hence do not know a history of rebellion against God like the Old World does, one paves the way for a racial ranking and thus for scientific racism which found its most devastating expression in the early anthropology of later nineteenth-century Social Darwinism (Coetzee, Daniel Defoe 25). This constitutes yet another method of reasoning which, somewhat similar to that on anthropophagy, ultimately belongs to the Western faith in progress and moral superiority. Again, it is one other emblem of ideological perception, which would only grow in strength and clarity as the imperial ages intensified and wore on.  
If we again return for a moment to Boehmer’s notion of the “paradigm” it should be understood that a colonialist reading of Robinson Crusoe should be carefully delineated. For such a reading will soon come to be separated from some of its historical circumstances, such as the commercial aspects of its publication, while it would indebt itself more to the novel’s history of reception, its various adoptions and appropriations, and, as we shall see, its canonisation. On closer inspection the novel is paradigmatic mainly because it can be said to contain the emblems of a number of motifs (such as the ideological reading of cannibalism) which only revealed their full significance once these were set off against the cultural and ideological history which envelops them.
Foe: Intertextuality, Self-reflexivity and Poetics
If the first of the two most conspicuous elements of Foe is its reference to the intertext of Robinson Crusoe, the second surely is its overt meta-fictional quality. Although some would disagree on labelling Foe a postmodernist novel (cf. Marais 67), I think Coetzee’s outright deployment of these two narrative techniques, self-reflexivity and intertextuality, leaves little room for doubt. Hans Bertens, in a standard overview of the postmodern begins by noting how for many (American) critics in the literary field “postmodernism is the turn towards self-reflexiveness in the so-called metafiction of the period” (4). Many if not all critics have acknowledged the centrality of this narrative technique within the novel as when for instance Dominic Head calls Foe “Coetzee’s most obviously metafictional text” (112).
The second feature, that of intertextuality, is informed by and part of the poststructuralist variation upon literary postmodernism whereby, in its most radical, Derridean conception all reality is seen as inhering in and constituted by the text. This notion was further developed in the 1980s, most prominently so by Michel Foucault. The assumption that textual representations do not simply reflect the world gave rise to questions like “whose history gets told? In whose name? For what purpose?” (Bertens 7) Such questions are of particular interest to Coetzee’s writing because here postmodernism becomes political. This postmodernism:
attempts to expose the politics that are at work in representations and to undo institutionalized hierarchies, and it works against the hegemony of any single discursive system – which would inevitably victimize other discourses – in its advocacy of difference, pluriformity, and multiplicity. Especially important are its interest in those who from the point of view of the liberal humanist subject (white, male, heterosexual and rational) constitute the ‘Other’ – the collective of those excluded from the privileges accorded by that subject to itself (women, people of color, non-heterosexuals, children) – and its interest in the role of representations in the constitution of ‘Otherness’. (Bertens 8)
It seems to me that with this outline early in Bertens book we already have a clear delineation of the area where postmodernism and post-colonialism meet and overlap. I will return to these issues at a later point when I will broadly outline some of post-colonialism’s main interests, eventually narrowing these down to an application to Coetzee’s novel. I will first turn to the novel proper and try to ascertain how it works, focusing on the issue of self-reflexivity.
What do we mean when we say that this or that novel is self-reflexive? Broadly speaking, it is to say that the writing of the story is foregrounded. The narrative process is brought to the fore, often to stress that the reader finds a particular rather than a definitive version of the events recounted and is invited to wonder why it is this version and not another. Early on in the narrative of Foe the reader becomes aware that indeed here (s)he is presented with one specific version of events. When Susan Barton first tells her story to Robinson Cruso she at one point paraphrases the very first lines of the novel:
Then at last I could row no further. My hands were raw, my back was burned, my body ached. With a sigh, making barely a splash, I slipped overboard and began to swim towards your island. The waves took me and bore me on to the beach. The rest you know.
With these words I presented myself to Robinson Cruso, in the days when he still ruled over the island, and became his second subject, the first being his manservant Friday. (Foe 11)
The dreamlike quality of the first paragraph of the novel, with Barton’s hair floating about her in the water, like a flower in the sea, is left out, but pointing out that these are the words she used to (re-)present herself means pointing out that, as the reader may recall the opening of the novel, she is actually paraphrasing herself. Therefore, what the reader had already tacitly understood is made explicit, i.e. he/she is reading the first-person account of Susan Barton as if it really happened (which is probably still the most fundamental working of fiction, or at least, one that people are accustomed to bear in mind). One should therefore also note that the very first character in the book is a single quotation mark which indicates that here, that is, in the first part of the novel, one finds a reproduction or a copy of a text which was put down at an earlier stage. As it turns out, the first section of the novel is the account that Barton sent to Foe in order for him to work it into a proper story.
While the above passage is important in that it also draws attention to the hierarchy Barton perceives to exist on Cruso’s island, labelling herself Cruso’s subject, the self-referencing is one of many meta-fictional threads from which she weaves her story. This particular passage proves to be of paramount importance, as it returns three more times throughout the novel, including an occurrence in the fourth and last, key part. 
The second instance runs as follows: “I am not a story, Mr. Foe. I may impress you as a story because I began my account of myself without preamble, slipping overboard into the water and striking out for the shore” (131). Incidentally, this also means that Barton began her account in medias res, stressing the issue of poetics, which I will touch upon below when I will discuss the antagonism between Barton and Foe on what should come to constitute her story.
The third instance runs as follows: “I presented myself to you in words I knew to be my own – I slipped overboard, I began to swim, my hair floated about me, and so forth, you will remember the words – and for a long time afterwards, when I was writing those letters that were never read by you, and were later not sent, and at last not even written down, I continued to trust in my own authorship” (133).
The fourth instance runs as follows: “Bringing the candle nearer, I read the first words of the tall, looping script: ‘Dear Mr Foe, At last I could row no further’” (155).
These four instances together, where the opening paragraph of Foe is paraphrased, are central to the discussion of the meta-fictional working of the novel. Significantly, also, the last self-referential instance occurs in the fourth part of the novel. That is when what is apparently Susan Barton’s account, this time properly addressed to Foe, is found by someone, a different narrator, who slips overboard him or herself (“With a sigh, making barely a splash, I slip overboard” (155)). Also, for the first time, the story is written in the present tense, whereas the first and third parts are set in the past and the second is an epistolary part.
What the first-person narrator actually finds here is the body of Susan Barton floating underwater, inside the wreck, offshore the island. However, the situation is confusing, and without clearly fixing a shift in locations, it is clear that the narrator slipping overboard, is the same who had just before entered the house of Daniel Defoe. Or more specifically, what is presumably the house of the historical Daniel Defoe, a slightly different name to appear in the novel. (Robinson Crusoe’s name is spelt Cruso in Foe) There is a plaque on the house the narrator enters which reads Daniel Defoe, Author, which according to some critics, Derek Attridge for instance, indicates that we are now in the present (182).
The fourth section of the novel may easily confound the reader and has, in any case, given rise to a variety of interpretations. To my mind, the crucial sentence here is: “But this is not a place of words ... This is a place where bodies are their own signs. It is the home of Friday” (Foe 157). What I propose to do, therefore, is to focus on the first three sections of the novel and treat the fourth at a later moment, when I try to come to terms with the figure of Friday. Since it is not a place of words one may wonder if Barton’s manuscript, at least that body of text which constitutes the first section of the novel, did in actual fact not get lost in the home of Friday. This would mean that at least the first section, but perhaps even all three sections, are relegated to a position “inside” the fourth; that in actual fact, the narrator of the fourth part finds the manuscript of the first, but perhaps also the second and third part inside the wreck.
Moving on from her account of herself, Barton continues her first paraphrase with her doubts about Cruso’s story. This introduces their differences of opinion and, in the novel, stages the onset of their antagonism:

I would gladly recount to you the history of this singular Cruso, as I heard it from his own lips. But the stories he told me were so various, and so hard to reconcile one with another, that I was more and more driven to conclude age and isolation had taken their toll on his memory, and he no longer knew for sure what was truth, what fancy ... So in the end I did not know what was truth, what was lies, and what was mere rambling. (Foe 11-12)

Patrick Corcoran in his article “Foe: Metafiction and the Discourse of Power” maintains that herein lies part of Barton and Cruso’s point of contention, namely, that she doubts Cruso’s truthfulness, Corcoran’s main point here being that “Susan would have him keep a journal – a written record of his life. Susan’s argument is that the writing of the story is a way of preserving the events recounted, perhaps even a way of endowing them with the status of reality, which they would otherwise never achieve” (258).
Another point of contention is that Cruso feels that Friday is in “no need of a great stock of words,” in response to which Barton points out the civilizing benefit of language (Foe 21). One might be a little surprised at this because it could seem to place Barton in the imperialist’s camp. Although this may seem to be a blatant dichotomy her antagonism towards Cruso here points forward to her complicity with Foe, the monger in words. Primarily, her opinion on language is in keeping with her desire to tell her story and to endow it with reality. (At the same time it is meant as a gesture towards the liberation of Friday, with Barton wanting to “build a bridge of words” allowing him to retrieve and recount his origin from before the time of Cruso and the island, which project, within the scope of this novel, is destined to fail (Foe 60).) It is, in any case, an instance where Barton shows herself not to be just a victim, as Macleod feels many critics have maintained. I will therefore focus on the relationship between Barton and Foe in terms of antagonism because this power struggle will deliver the refutation of Macleod’s argument that Barton has too readily been labelled a victim of “hegemonic masculinity” and the patriarchal, literary institution. Of course, Barton’s opposition to Cruso is mirrored in that between her and Foe later on, as Corcoran also notes. Here she cannot tell truth, lies and mere rambling apart, while later on she will have to fight to include in her story that which she wants in and to exclude that which she wants out. This is the main and most apparent opposition in the novel and constitutes the main power struggle.
It is the third part of the novel then, which presents one with most of the central complications which principally derive from the fact that here for the first time Foe is given a voice. He turns out to be an authority Barton will have to come to terms with. It is he who introduces aspects both of structure and poetics, which immediately become a problem for Barton and which in turn both belong to the larger, meta-fictional framework of Foe the novel. The character Foe, who up to this point had been the much sought after, intended biographer of Susan Barton, quickly presents himself as yet another complication in Barton’s ongoing struggle. Her desire to have her story told, which in the second, mostly epistolary part, had taken the form of the conviction that it must be told by him, is frustrated. This frustration takes the form of an opposition with on the one hand Foe, who introduces aspects of poetics and structure, while Barton prefers to stress the island episode and the silence of Friday while also touching upon poetics.
When Foe summarizes Barton’s adventure for her, to point out that a structuring of her story is in order, he identifies five parts, of which the island episode is just one. Barton and Foe must render vividness to her story, on that much they agree. But it is Foe who speaks in the capacity of an author when he says that they “can bring it to life only by setting it in a larger story” (Foe 117). And it is Foe therefore, who comes up with a fivefold division while at the same time introducing the question of poetics:
	
We therefore have five parts in all: the loss of the daughter; the quest for the daughter in Brazil; abandonment of the quest, and the adventure of the island; assumption of the quest by the daughter; and reunion of the daughter with the mother. It is thus that we make up a book: loss, then quest, then recovery; beginning, then middle, then end. (Foe 117)

This passage presents two new problems to Barton’s quest. The first problem is to do with the fivefold structure, namely that this is complicated by the fact that the novel proper consists of only four parts. This is ironic because, despite Barton’s vehement efforts to have Foe write down her story, the novel proper consists largely, with the exception of the fourth section, of Barton’s own words.
Secondly however, regarding poetics, it is consistent to note that, while Barton disagrees completely with which parts should make up her story, she agrees with Foe that storytelling is the way to go about this. Barton wants to include Friday in her story to break his silence (Friday confronts the reader with the question of silence and voice). She eloquently points this out, very decisively speaking on behalf of Friday, perhaps even intertwining their fates and, in turn with Foe, touches upon poetics herself: “The true story of Friday will not be heard till by art we have found a means of giving voice to Friday” (Foe 118).
The second problem then, that of poetics, is not so much a problem in that Barton disagrees on the necessity of using literary devices; as I will show, it is this necessity, among other considerations, which induced her to seek Foe out in the first place (See section below: Narrative, Discourse and Power). But in the scuffle over what elements are eventually to make up her story Barton shows herself to be complicit with Foe the professional author. Up until the third section of the novel, anticipating upon her literary liaison with Foe, she at many times willingly concedes that she requires the art of storytelling, because she lacks “the knack of seeing waves when there are fields before your eyes,” for instance (Foe 52). From the passage above we may further induce that we are to understand that Foe is a representative of the long-standing tradition, which began with Aristotle (to have a beginning, a middle and an end). When Foe remarks: “As to novelty, this is lent by the island episode … ” we recognize the poetic imperative to make something new, while even Horace may shimmer in the background, with the famous ‘to teach and delight’ from his Ars Poetica. When Barton wonders “What will we tell folk in England when they ask us to divert them?” (43), we are reminded of Daniel Defoe’s own prefaces to both Roxana and Robinson Crusoe as for instance in the first case where the narrator trusts that the history of Roxana will “be read both with profit and delight” (Roxana 36).
What this dispute over the matter of form demonstrates first of all is that Barton cannot avoid adopting the received literary language and its devices if she is ever to construct her own story. The dispute is the culmination of “the growing awareness of her inability to create narratives which are not always already controlled – indeed violated – by the effect of pre-existing discourses on their form” (Jolly 61). Indeed, as I have similarly outlined above, Rosemary Jolly sees this pressing mould of the formal aspects as a reference to “the western, male traditions of writing and colonizing,” and “her inheritance of traditions which undercut her attempts to liberate her narrative is demonstrated by her struggles against the authority of Foe” (62). But, while I will investigate Barton’s entanglement and complicity with the Western literary tradition from a different viewpoint in the next section, brief mention must be made of why Foe has different plans for the plot of Barton’s story.  
The quest for the lost daughter, which Foe wants to include in the story, is a reversal of the second intertext to which Coetzee alludes, that of Roxana. When eventually this daughter seeks Barton out in turn she refuses to acknowledge her just like Roxana rejects her daughter in Defoe’s novel. Barton professes that the girl, who is her namesake, is in actual fact Foe’s daughter and that he made up the story of her parentage. Details linking Coetzee’s text to those of Defoe are scattered across the text, as when for instance the reader will recognize Roxana’s first husband, the brewer, when Barton claims that Foe “is the author of the story of the brewer” (Foe 91). What is important is that the story of Roxana, under the pressure of Foe, threatens to overtake that of Barton but that it never actually does. It is basically for this reason, I assume, that quite a few critics make but a passing reference to this second intertext, focusing instead on Robinson Crusoe. Of course, in the end Foe is not successful in persuading Barton to comply with the plot he has in mind and this is quite simply reflected in the fact mentioned above that the first three sections are her relations and not his. Dominic Head, in one interpretation of the second intertextual layer of Coetzee’s novel asserts that the threat of Foe might ultimately be to contain Barton in a separate story, namely that of Roxana. Departing from this assumption Head maintains that, if Foe were to succeed then “Crusoe remains a myth of the male pioneering spirit, while the challenge which Susan represents is reinscribed, in Roxana, as a challenge to codes of economic subjugation and sexual fidelity in marriage” (115).
Eventually, as we will see, the novel does not move towards the intertext of Roxana but towards the intertextual figure of Friday. As I have said, the word “story” is the noun that seems to most frequently occur in the novel and the self-reflexive meditations on the poetical aspects of storytelling stress Barton’s entanglement with the figure of Foe. As I have already suggested, most critics read Barton along these lines, leading them to acknowledge her ambiguous position. Before I will compare my evaluation of some of this work to that of Macleod I will first delve deeper into the relationship between Barton and Foe.
“Discourse, Power and Access”
Teun van Dijk, in his Discourse, Power and Access, investigated properties of power as dimensions of all kinds of discourse through a process known as Critical Discourse Analysis. One important aspect of discourse is the extent of access to a given form of communication. Though Van Dijk’s approach is a sociological one, investigating power emanating, through discourse, from social groups, institutions or organizations, certain findings of his are relevant to the dealings between Barton and Foe. At one point Van Dijk stresses the importance of a measure of control over discourse: “The crucial form of access consists of the power to control various dimensions of speech and talk itself: which mode of communication may/must be used (spoken, written), which language may/must be used by whom (dominant or standard language, a dialect, etc.), which genres of discourse are allowed ...” (88). Besides these overall constraints, participants may have differential access to “topics, style or rhetoric” (88) Van Dijk concludes that “having access to the speech act of a command presupposes as well as enacts and confirms the social power of the speaker” (88). On the narrative level this holds true for Foe as well for he is sought out by Barton in the capacity of an author, which confirms his role as such with implications for certain aspects of the narrative he is to construct. Thus Barton presupposes that he has the power to tell her story the way it should be told, while in the process rendering her own position more problematic. For, although having her story told is a way of asserting her own power, Barton renders herself powerless to the extent in which she feels impelled to relegate narrative aspects to the command of Foe.
But what does it mean for Barton to hand over part of her power over her own origination to the writer Foe? Power is to do with control and broadly speaking, such control can either be exerted over the actions or over the minds of people. The latter kind of control is the one at play here. Barton’s origination, that is, her initiation or ‘coming into’ the world, is felt to have to take place through writing: “Will you not bear it in mind, however, that my life is drearily suspended till your writing is done?” (Foe 63). It is the idea of being seen by the other, which is a coming into existence in the eye of the other, for which purpose a picture has to be drawn up. This picture consists of a mental image, evoked through representation, which representation is a construct or artefact. Foe, as an author, is deemed to possess the technical capabilities that allow him to construct such a representation. Indeed, the need for Barton to seek out Foe for the task she has envisioned for him, comes from the fact that he is qualified to take it up, whereas she is not (She at one point admits that the account she sends to Foe is a “sorry, limping affair” (47).). Just by the act of requesting his services Foe is confirmed in his role and the power that comes with the job. Thus, only in this very particular aspect, Barton shows herself to be inferior to Foe, without any further connotations or relevance beyond this technicality however, for the antagonism between the two is in no way resolved or decided by Foe’s standing.
The control that Foe tries to exercise is over, in the words of Van Dijk, a number of dimensions of speech and talk, or, in this case, writing. In particular Foe has a say in “which genres of discourse are allowed”, while, when Van Dijk notes that “participants may have differential access to topics, style or rhetoric”, it is clear that these three elements are all relevant points of contention between Barton and Foe (88). Staging a struggle for control over the topical issue, as we have seen, is one of the functions of the intertexts of Foe, with Roxana threatening to overtake the intended narrative of Barton. Furthermore, I have subsumed the issue of style under the heading of poetics. And by extension, one could also look further at the issue of genre for Barton is thoroughly self-conscious about the perceived need to draft her story within a particular framework for an audience that is “reared on travellers’ tales” (Foe 7). What I have tried to do so far is to demonstrate how all these elements show how Barton is caught up with the professional author Foe. In order to come to a finalized reading of this important character, however, we need to return to the issue of intertextuality within the scope of the process of canon formation or canonisation.
Foe as Representative of the Western, Literary Institution: Intertextuality and Canonisation
Why does Barton seek out Foe? Although he resembles one, Foe is not a so-called ghost-writer, like famous people sometimes employ professional writers to have their biography written down (f.i. film stars, politicians or tycoons). What is the purpose that Barton and Foe have in mind for their story? One purpose that Barton at least at one instance mentions, is to sell the story. The possibility is first suggested to her by Captain Smith after he has rescued her from the island, and he already anticipates the role Foe might play in this scheme: “…but you may depend on it, the booksellers will hire a man to set your story to rights, and put in a dash of colour in too, here and there” (Foe 40). (Although Captain Smith does have a ghost-writer in mind it is clear that Foe imagines his role differently.) This reference to the publishing market is yet another version of intertextuality for it is in details like these that we recognize Daniel Defoe and his actual situation. For, as I have outlined above with reference to Richetti’s remarks, Robinson Crusoe was one of the first best sellers. A related point of recognition is that Foe is debt-ridden, a predicament that befell the historical Defoe twice. We may say that yet another reason for Barton to apply to Foe is to gain access to the publishing market. For this, it is useful to consider Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of cultural capital and the struggle in the (literary) market to confer cultural value upon cultural products. This struggle is over “…the monopoly of literary legitimacy, i.e., inter alia, the monopoly of the power to say with authority who are authorized to call themselves writers ...” The writer or novelist is one of several “agents of legitimation,” others being, not coincidentally, the booksellers Captain Smith speaks of (as well as literary critics) (qtd. in Huggan 5). In Bourdieu’s phrase, all such agents participate in consecrating products with cultural value. Given this insight, and given Van Dijk’s notion of access, we arrive at yet a different angle from which to shed light on Barton’s deliberations. Barton is aware of, and is out for, the consecration of her story. She is aware that, if she is to access the publishing market, she will need to abide by its rules and hence, will have to enlist the professional, recognized services of Foe. Barton, that is, subscribes to the fact that she will have to turn the raw materials into an entertaining and economically viable story, a saleable commodity (cf. Foe 34, 82). 
This constitutes another pre-condition which informs the antagonism between Barton and Foe. As I noted earlier, Rosemary Jolly stresses the impossibility for Barton to circumvent the received tradition of the Western, male, literary discourse, which tradition, she also maintains, is represented by Foe. Applying notions from postmodern fictional historiography delivers further insight into Barton’s predicament.
In Writing History as a Prophet Lies Wesseling has investigated the workings of the postmodernist historical novel. This particular kind of novel operates self-reflexively in order to think through how historical events are interpreted and endowed with meaning and also to see what are the politics of this or that particular interpretation or, rather, historical representation. Where modernist writing of this kind focused mostly on matters of epistemology, i.e. investigating ways to arrive at knowledge of the past, postmodernist writing does the same but also takes this project one step further to play with alternate versions of histories which had hitherto often remained uncontested. Wesseling calls this play upon alternate histories counterfactual conjecture:

The difference in focus between self-reflexivity and counterfactual conjecture is not so much a matter of epistemology versus ontology, but of epistemology versus politics. The self-reflexive exposure of the devices for historical research and narration mainly comment upon the intelligibility and the representation of the past, whereas the overt contradiction of canonized history in postmodernist texts often serves to foreground the ways in which versions of history function as instruments of power in the present. (Wesseling 125)

Note how these notions of Wesseling’s refer to a political postmodernism, as opposed to a more freely operating, ‘playful’ postmodernism. On the theoretical level this suggests that the relationship between postmodernism and post-colonialism is partly one of politics. In the passage cited above, Bertens, in a similar vein, points to the politics of postmodernist (literary) representation inspired by an “advocacy of difference.”
What constitutes the novel Foe is not so much an “overt contradiction of canonized history” but rather an overt contradiction of a canonized literary text. That is to say that the deliberate play upon Robinson Crusoe is aimed at the status or literary standing of that novel. It is clear that Robinson Crusoe, one of the very first novels to ever have been written in the English language, is a long-standing member of the English literary canon and it is no coincidence that Coetzee has opted for such a prominent member to figure as the main intertext within his novel. 
When Derek Attridge investigates the politics of canonisation in “Oppressive Silence: J.M. Coetzee’s Foe and the Politics of Canonisation”, he identifies the perennial themes of the Western canon as traditionally humanist concerns. Over the years, canonical works have more often than not observed “the solitary individual in a hostile and physical environment to raise questions about the foundations of civilisation and humanity” (Attridge 170). To be sure, one is reminded of the situation the original Crusoe finds himself in but, in a different sense, this holds true for Coetzee’s novels as well. Therefore, that is, with respect to these humanist thematics, “the high literary canon, in its most traditional form, is premised upon an assumption of universal moral and aesthetic values” (171). Incidentally, if one were to attack Coetzee for appealing to transcendent, mythical truths and values because he thereby foregoes actual and particular political situations, such as those in his own South Africa for instance, such an attack would be levelled because his work indeed often seems to adhere to such a traditional feature of the canon. Also, because, within the canon, later works often reference earlier works, thereby consolidating and prolonging their canonical status, and because Coetzee not only in Foe but also in such novels as The Life and Times of Michael K. (which is generally taken to allude to Franz Kafka’s epitomical character Jozef K.) does precisely that, he, i.e. Coetzee, could be said to work towards his own inclusion in the traditional canon. Yet, despite Coetzee’s apparent complicity he does much to question an unproblematic notion of the canon. Attridge notes that Coetzee’s fiction, often through the same characteristics as mentioned above, exposes “the ideological basis of canonisation” and “its own relation to the existing canon,” it thematises “the role of class, race and gender in the processes of cultural acceptance and exclusion” and it addresses “the question of marginality” (171). As far as referencing the existing canon goes it must be said that such allusiveness and/or (overt) intertextuality may also constitute a foregrounding of how a “text, like any text, is manufactured from the resources of a particular culture in order to gain acceptance within that culture...” (172). What Attridge means to say is that, although Coetzee’s work’s allusiveness to the existing canon may be perceived as a strategy to work towards its adoption or inclusion in that canon, canonical works that perceive their status or canonical standing as unproblematic would not and cannot self-reflect on this process of intertextual manufacture. The status of the canon as a given of (a) culture cannot remain uncontested once its constructed-ness and interdependence within a supposed closed body of texts is revealed. This constitutes a poststructuralist critique by which any text is seen as referencing and dependent upon a possibly infinite number of texts which precede it. What the working of the novel Foe relies upon, therefore, is not so much an unproblematic, traditional reference to Robinson Crusoe, but an overt contradiction of this canonical novel. 
Now if we go back to Wesseling’s notion that certain postmodernist historical novels through contradiction foreground how received versions of history may serve as instruments of power in the present it is valid to say Foe employs a similar sort of politics. For if the reference to the received canon does not work to manufacture a new text that itself is to be taken up in that canon, then it works to expose the workings of canonisation. And once exposed, reconsideration becomes possible (One such reconsideration is the reading I have provided of Robinson Crusoe). One of these workings, as Attridge shows, is a role played by “class, race and gender in the processes of cultural acceptance and exclusion” (171). Quite obviously, albeit generically (one remembers Macleod’s warning against the overtaxing potential of “established critical templates” (3)), Barton and Friday are there to play out the role of gender and race, while the author Foe, roughly speaking, represents class. More precisely, Foe represents a patriarchal, institutionalised voice to show how the processes of acceptance and exclusion work. Returning to Van Dijk’s notion of access it is clear that Barton seeks out Foe, not simply to have her story told in a ‘proper’ way, the way a true author would write it, but that she needs his professional service to (allegorically) gain access to the literary canon. 
The more narrow function of Foe as an author also gains wider significance when paralleled to the notion of sanction in Robert Young. When he states that “most of the writing that has dominated what the world calls knowledge has been produced by people living in western countries in the past three or more centuries, and it is this kind of knowledge that is elaborated within and sanctioned by the academy, the institutional knowledge corporation,” he is referring to, for instance, anthropological knowledge, or any scientific mode to view the non-west (Young 18). However, Foe attempts on an allegorical level to subject the knowledge of Barton’s predicaments to a similar sanction (He even does so in a soothing voice, laying a hand on her knee (Foe 117)). Barton’s wish to preserve what has befallen her comes to be judged, as if she were an object, and the working out of the subject matter of her adventures needs to be sanctioned or authorized by Foe. Again, in essence this sanction would only completely be granted on his terms if the intertext of Roxana were to take over. But as we are left with Foe the novel as it is this dispute remains unresolved. Indeed, Barton’s position is meant to remain ambiguous, which can be further clarified when we look at how notions of authorship or author-ity and patriarchy are mixed and reversed. Consider the following passage:

When I wrote my memoir for you, and saw how like the island it was, under my pen, dull and vacant and without life, I wished that there were such a being as a man-Muse, a youthful god who visited authoresses in the night and made their pens flow. But now I know better. The muse is both goddess and begetter. I was intended not to be the mother of my story, but to beget it. It is not I who am the intended, but you. But why need I argue my case? When is it ever asked of a man that he plead in syllogisms? Why should it be demanded of me? (Foe 126)

The syllogism Barton uses here rests upon the premisses sharing the commonality of begetting, i.e. that the muse begets stories upon writers and that Barton is meant to beget her story. She therefore concludes that she is to ‘beget’ the story upon Foe, which deduction is further supported when, a little later, Foe says: “...wait to see what fruit I bear” (152). Another illuminative instance (among a few more) is when she says: “It is still in my power to guide and amend. Above all, to withhold. By such means do I still endeavour to be father to my story” (Foe 123). This constitutes a reversal through which Barton becomes entirely complicit with the patriarchal literary institution. In the words of Patrick Corcoran this particular reversal demonstrates that Barton “may be a victim, but the subtlety of Coetzee’s text is that it illustrates how victims too can simultaneously be oppressors.” It is her way, as indeed it is everybody’s way, to “maintain a handle on the world and exercise power within it” (Corcoran 265).
As this citation already exemplifies, Corcoran is one of those critics who recognizes Barton’s duality as both victim and oppressor. Moreover, Corcoran also recognizes that the art of storytelling and, by extension, issues of narrative and discourse, are fundamentally implicated in this ambiguity. I will therefore briefly look at the issue of narrative and discourse as Macleod foregrounds it and will then touch upon readings of Foe that have taken thorough notice of this.
First Conclusion: Susan Barton’s Discursive Complicity
When we for a moment consider Michael Marais’ concise summary of post-colonialism’s perceived theoretical necessity for the ‘other’ to voice selfhood we find that: “In general, post-colonial discourse recognizes the relation of language to power and oppression and the crucial role that language plays in impeding the ability of the other to express self” (73). Even so: “This is not the case in Coetzee’s work, however, where the other, as soon as it attempts to recapture selfhood by appropriating the language of the coloniser, loses its alterior status and reinscribes itself within imperialist discourse” (73-74). This is entirely relevant to Barton’s predicament. If we turn for a moment to Macleod’s reading of Barton we find the straightforward assertion that: “Susan wants to narrate the world and ends up as somebody else’s character. Foe’s skills outrival hers and this has a negative effect on her sense of control in the world, but the discrepancy arises out of a difference in narrative ability, not power or ethical intentionality” (Macleod 5). The common denominator between these two statements is a stress on discourse and narrative ability (the latter of which I have discussed within the concept of poetics and, by extension, that of Van Dijk’s access). The question this beckons is whether Barton compromises herself because she adopts imperialist discourse? The answer, according to Marais and Macleod, is, of course, yes. But the ultimate question with reference to Macleod is whether we then still see critics, in a misguided effort as Macleod has it, read Barton as a “marginalized quest figure who is victimized by oppressive structures” (3). Quite clearly the answer is no, for it seems to me that most critics do in fact foreground the issue of narrative skill and storytelling, just like Macleod would have it. 
As we have already seen for instance, when commenting upon the authorial and sexual reversal between Foe and Barton, Corcoran notes that Coetzee shows “how victims too can simultaneously be oppressors” (260). And although he seems wary of definitively labelling Barton either victim or oppressor he does note how Barton forcefully abducts Cruso and Friday from the island (260). Macleod likewise brings this act to the fore to point out that Barton is not so innocent (5). And, more generally, if the category of the feminine is what on a theoretical level has misguided critics, Sue Kossew surely is not one of them.   
Kossew has looked at the first three woman narrators in Coetzee’s novels: Magda (In the Heart of the Country), Susan Barton (Foe) and Elizabeth Curren (Age of Iron). Through the voice of these female protagonists, according to Kossew, Coetzee deals with precisely the dangers of reinscription and the ambiguities of self-assertion within imperialist discourse. 

Rather, it is the very contradictions involved in their own status within the colonial equation that characterise these women narrators, who speak not from a position of either strength or of weakness, not really “half-colonized” (which implies that they do not fully partake in the process of colonizing) but as both colonised and colonising. Coetzee’s women narrators are each, in their own ways, concerned to find an authentic “woman’s voice” to set against patriarchal authority but their search is complicated by their own complicity in that authority. (Kossew 168)   

Quite clearly now Macleod’s criticism of a supposed overtaxing of Barton as a “truth-seeking, marginalized quest figure ... victimized by oppressive structures,” that is, oppressed by the patriarchism of both Foe and Cruso, does not hold for every critic. Generally, as Kossew observes, one must keep in mind that the category of the feminine, especially with regard to the white female narrators of the aforementioned novels, cannot be equated one on one with otherness and exclusion. Still, an interesting question to be asked is how the white female author could, and indeed, in the case of Barton, does speak as both colonized and colonizing. Quite clearly this duality inhering in the speech and writing of these authors is an effect of language and discourse alone. Authoresses like Barton are left with an imperialist discourse with which to voice their dissent and, simply by taking up such a discourse, become implicated in the imperial project. It is thus that Kossew notes that “Despite Susan’s questioning of authority and power, she still insists on the medium of “art” as a “means of giving voice to Friday” (118) and thus puts herself, with Foe, on the side of the colonising activity implicit in the narrativising practises of history and fiction” (173).
Although Macleod all but makes it appear as if he has read every critic on Coetzee’s novel,​[6]​ he has overlooked this article by Sue Kossew, which clearly refutes his accusations with regard to the reading of Barton. 
Quite clearly, then, Kossew does stress the force of discursive structures pressing its users in a mould, as it were, making them complicit or, at least, having them occupy a mediatory position rather than a liberating one. It is, perhaps, a bit lame to basically accuse Macleod of not having read the complete critical oeuvre on Coetzee. Coming up with two ‘black swans’ amidst an ever growing flock of white ones seems of little importance if all the other critics were seriously misguided. But all the critics I have read do in fact explicitly acknowledge Foe’s foregrounding of narrative power and, oftentimes too, the proficiency needed to wield such power. None of them, at least, ignores the centrality of the role Barton plays and, despite her apparent opposition to Foe, most critics discern her being caught up, unstable and suspended within the discursive structures she seeks “substance” in.
Chapter 2 Post-colonial Theory, Friday
Now that the meta-fictional workings of the novel Foe and the main points of interest, which I have centred on the antagonism between Barton and Foe, have been examined, it is time to turn to Friday and the critical assessments of this important figure. For this I propose to look into some aspects of post-colonial theory which I think are relevant in order to provide some of the theoretical background pertaining to both Macleod’s essay and Foe. 
The proliferous dissemination of the term post-colonialism over the past quarter century or so has called for much debate. One problem with the ‘post-word’, as it is sometimes referred to (similar to one of the problems surrounding the use of the word ‘post-modernism’), is that it would too readily invoke a dual perception of a world condition, i.e. one that has neatly come into existence after the colonial era. Although complete consistency with regard to the word’s spelling does not exist, if the word is used as a period marker one often finds the hyphenated “post-colonialism.” Be that as it may, the problem with the prefix “post” when it is used descriptively is that it severs the state or the condition of the post-colonial from some of the inciting forces that often started to inform such a condition at a much earlier stage. As Elleke Boehmer points out: “It is worth recalling also that initiatives towards self-affirmation that we now call postcolonial first began to emerge before the time of formal independence, and therefore strictly speaking formed part – albeit a special part – of colonial literature” (5). And when Boehmer enumerates some synonyms for post-colonial literature she also cites the writer Ben Okri who described such writing as the “literature of the newly ascendant spirit” (5). This new spirit can thus be said to have been looking to reaffirm itself ever since imperial powers started to suppress it, although it only officially re-instated itself after formal independence. A link could even be traced back over all three eras, including that of the pre-colonial, where, one could presume, lies the ‘source’.  
Still, while such a linearity is possible to envisage metaphorically it is not without faults. Because the term ‘post-colonialism’ is in part used to describe a world condition and because one of that condition’s features is a state of crisis within the grand narrative of Western, enlightened, rational progress, the teleological connotations of the word are compromised from the start. “Metaphorically, the term ‘post-colonialism’ marks history as a series of stages along an epochal road from ‘the pre-colonial’, to ‘the colonial’, to ‘the post-colonial’ – an unbidden, if disavowed, commitment to linear time and the idea of ‘development’” (McClintock 292). This sense of the term has indeed been disavowed, it seems, and Anne McClintock later explains how this view took shape. When she comes back to the metaphor of the ‘road’ she notes how it guaranteed that ‘progress’ was a fait accompli: “The journey was possible because the road had already been made” (302). If anything is clear in these post-marked times however, it is that no single road leads to a single, or monolithic and universal state of ‘salvation’. Post-colonialism’s professed attention to difference, multiplicity and hybridity should therefore only reservedly be subsumed under the oversimplifying, binary banner that is this term.
McClintock identifies multiple problems surrounding the term, exemplifying instances where it fails to account for the specificity of a situation as in cases where internal inequalities on a national scale, for instance, are obfuscated by a prematurely celebrated post-colonial state of independence. Or, in the related case of men and women (that is, denoting the generically descriptive categories of the ‘male’ and the ‘female’) she notes that they “do not share the same ‘post-colonial condition’” for “no ‘post-colonial’ state anywhere has granted women and men equal access to the rights and resources of the nation-state.” All of these observations that McClintock makes come down to the fact that a single, unifying concept easily comes to belie the very multiplicity of a situation or event, it almost invariably signifying different things to different people, and the multiplicity of events that are currently still reshaping the methodologies that we bring to the scene. 
Others have identified the over-generalizing tendency that often worked its way into post-colonial theories as well. Ania Loomba has noted that post-colonial theory becomes inadequate when it is used to describe the state of post-coloniality as “a vague condition of people anywhere and everywhere” so that “the specificities of locale do not matter” (17). It is interesting to see that today, still, such warning side-notes are warranted as Macleod’s article basically consists of just such a restriction on what has thus far been said on Foe. It is precisely the generic, obscuring potential of some of post-colonialism’s prime signifiers, the ethnic and female ‘other’, or “established critical templates to do with gender and colonialism,” which informs his analysis (Macleod 3). To be sure, Boehmer, McClintock and Loomba are not the only ones to express reservations about the overriding impetus that methodology and ready terminology, if not handled diligently, at times threaten to exert. Indeed, a great many critics stop for a moment to deliberate on these problematics before presenting their research findings. 
Despite the oftentimes fine methodological difficulties one encounters, such consideration still is, I think, a productive sign of good faith. And, in any case, calls for nuance such as those cited above, legitimate an article such as that of Macleod. His analysis, in fact, is a case in point, underscoring the expressed need to keep evaluating and rethinking what was handed down to us in order to fine-tune a version of events. His reading of Friday’s silence as a wilful act of defiance (in face of the inscriptive efforts of both Barton and Foe) leads one to an article such as that of Michael Marais. In one such brief but valuable deliberation on the application of the label post-colonial (borrowing from the work of Stephen Slemon) Marais proposes to have it primarily designate a discursive anti-stance (66-67). As I will demonstrate with specific regard to the figure of Friday at a later point, such a reading of post-colonial (fictional) narratives as counter-discursive seems useful, too, because such a reading neither refers to a location nor to a time but essentially to the ethic and/or politic displacement of all that is colonialist. If one agrees on the post-colonial imperative to ‘voice otherness’, presupposing that such is both possible, as well as intelligible to the historically located imperial subject, then such a counter-discourse can be said to bring about the desired post-colonial condition on the textual, and by extension, epistemological level. It would become truly possible to ‘think’ otherness.
At this point I think it is useful to ask some rather blunt questions. These are informed by the more specific and eloquent question Gayatri Spivak asks when she theorizes from the location of the present-day American and European academic meditating on otherness and on how these meditations may reflect back upon oneself:

The necessarily open critical frame reminds us that the institutional organization of historical context is no more than our unavoidable starting point. The question remains: With this necessary preparation, to quote Sartre again, how does “the European” – or, in the neocolonial context, the U.S. critic and teacher of the humanities – redo in himself (or herself) the project of the Chinese, of the Indian or the African? (Spivak 173) 

Ultimately, the historical context Spivak speaks of is that of imperialism in the broadest sense: economic and military, scientific, cultural and ideological, and always hegemonic. My questions are: given this unavoidable context, why is it necessary to hear the voice of otherness? Because, in the course of our self-made history, ‘we’ have never listened. And also because, in any case, ‘we’ have read him/her wrong. Why would the other voice (him)self? Indeed, why would (s)he? We think it is because ‘we’, to put it mildly, have forced ourselves upon him/her, smothering their voices. But Spivak warningly reminds us that we simply cannot know what the outcome of the event of voicing will be: “The named marginal is as much a concealment as a disclosure of the margin, and where s/he discloses, s/he is singular” (173). These questions are of invaluable importance when reading the figure of Friday. The unavoidable singularity of the disclosure of Friday is anticipated by Macleod as well when he calls for idiosyncratic terms to provide a reading of Friday (14). 
But, to momentarily switch back again, Spivak asks how the European and American subject redoes, or re-reads in himself the project of the other. As I will argue, when discussing Marais’ article, I think the step that needs to be taken before this one is posing the question whether the subject actually does re-read himself. For a momentary act of self-reflexive examination is implicated in any encounter with silence, which moment eventually results in the formal imperative to ‘self-examine’, that is, only after the silent encounter. The discourse of this re-examination is the counter-discourse Marais (and Slemon) speak of. What we therefore will have to examine in more detail is which particular discourse must be countered? I have already alluded to the concept of hegemony, which is derived from Gramsci, roughly linking it to that of imperialism. Of course, this brings one to Edward Said’s standard work Orientalism, the groundbreaking discourse analysis of the (one-sided) institutionalized colonial encounter.  

Orientalism, Discourse and Counter-discourse
 From Orientalism:

My principal operating assumptions were – and continue to be – that fields of learning, as much as the works of even the most eccentric artist, are constrained and acted upon by society, by cultural traditions, by worldly circumstance and by stabilizing influences like schools, libraries and governments; moreover, that both learned and imaginative writing are never free, but are limited in their imagery, assumptions and intentions; and finally, that the advances made by a ‘science’ like Orientalism in its academic form are less objectively true than we often like to think. (Said 141)

How would an imaginative work be limited in its assumptions (Naturally, I am here thinking of works of prose fiction, in particular Robinson Crusoe)? Surely by the impositions and restrictions, the very limits of knowledge within adjacent superstructures, such as that of science, its research and findings informing the imagination. The humanities would be those which most bear upon literary creation, with its insights into human behaviour and motives, social and historical formations and what Said calls a “regular constellation of ideas” (133).
When Said writes that a scholar is inescapably attached to “the circumstances of life” and that there is no method for detaching him from “the fact of his involvement (conscious or unconscious) with a class, a set of beliefs, a social position, or from the mere activity of being a member of a society,” he is talking about the improbability of ever fully distinguishing pure (or scientific) knowledge from political knowledge (136). It should also be understood that this holds true for any member of (eighteenth century) society. Members had to make do with whatever information and knowledge was available and made known to them. Not only does the difficulty of freeing oneself of the formative circumstances of life mean for the scholar that he is in danger of articulating or covertly (even unconsciously) supporting political attitudes in what is to be taken as a professedly objective, scientific work, it also means that the meaning and connotations of a work are limited historically. As what we nowadays recognize as post-colonial anti-stance works were unknown to someone like Daniel Defoe it was impossible for him to occupy, let alone to think such a position. This is the way in which Said uses Gramsci’s idea of hegemony. Imperialist ideology and colonialist practice, rather than post-colonialist ones, dominated and were hegemonic. This fed into the consciousness of a whole society. This is why, for instance, Said points out that every historically imperial subject (The European as a category) could be but “racist, an imperialist, and almost totally ethnocentric” (142). The hegemonic formation that we indicate generically under the heading of imperialism determines how the individual (or the active member of a society) had little more available to him besides “imperialism, racism and ethnocentrism for dealing with ‘other’ cultures” (143). 
That this is why it is possible to circumscribe a colonialist ideology becomes clear from such overviews as that of Elleke Boehmer which allow us to place Robinson Crusoe, albeit retrospectively, in a colonialist tradition (as I have attempted to do). Such accounts likewise explain how imaginative writing, (often thought of as designating a space completely free of limitations where, potentially, anything goes) too, may be limited in its imagery. In this respect, as I have described it, the discourse on cannibalism, to which we may say Robinson Crusoe is symbiotically related, resembles the mechanics of Orientalist discourse. What I have called ideological image-building resulted in an inevitable practise. The stock of images with which to label members of alien cultures was of necessity limited. Applying the image of the cannibal rendered them ´other´ and thus legitimated their subjection. Thus, by extension, Defoe could but imagine Friday in imperialist and ethnocentric terms.   
However, Said’s use of the notion of hegemony does not go uncontested. Dennis Porter has pointed out that Said uses the term in a static, unchanging sense and therefore collapses pretty much the whole history of Oriental discourse, spanning some two millennia and comprising the amassed body of these utterances, into a unified whole, bringing it in under the umbrella of Orientalism. But hegemony is rather to be understood as indicative of ever-developing formations and formulations and “(S)uch a sense of hegemony as process in concrete historical conjunctures, as an evolving sphere of superstructural conflict in which power relations are continually reasserted, challenged, modified, is absent from Said’s book” (Porter 152). Said is therefore susceptible to the charge of essentialism and apparently unable to recognize differentiating and/or opposing voices, such as Porter describes these himself. 
If, in Said’s conception, Orientalist works are invariably informed by the mere possibility of domineering, through discourse, an alien and (statistically) silent Orient, then we would likely be inattentive to “the possibility of ideological distanciation within works of the Western literary canon” (153).​[7]​   
And yet, of course, Porter finds dissent and distanciation in the exemplifying autobiography Seven Pillars of Wisdom (T.E. Lawrence 1926). This modern writer “becomes so absorbed by the aesthetic problems posed by representation and by the play of words on the page that new possibilities emerge unbidden from their combinations. As a result, Western ideological representation may be perceived by an appropriately positioned reader to be both asserted and put into question” (Porter 156). If we then jump to Porter’s earlier remark on canonical works we find: “If it is true that a given hegemonic order is reproduced in part through the mechanism of exposing succeeding generations to the literary canon, a reading that uncovers doubt and contradiction within a canonical work obviously raises the possibility of counter-hegemonic energies” (155). The case that Porter is making here is a complex one, and one should remember that he uses a dynamic conception of (cultural) hegemony. Because Lawrence is preoccupied with the free play of language, with sheer aestheticism, “new possibilities emerge unbidden.” Part of this aesthetic enthusiasm is inspired by the protagonist’s geographic displacement in a different culture​[8]​. As Seven Pillars of Wisdom in the course of time grows into a canonical work, the unbidden possibilities prove to be unsettling energies. In other words, this book reveals itself as a transitional work within shifting hegemonic formations. That is why the protagonist at times is shown to abide by an identifiably Orientalist discourse while at other instances, under the influence of his displacement, he can be seen to diverge. He finds himself in a state of transit and comes to emblematize this process on a discursive as well as a geo-political level.
Interestingly enough, then, Porter’s accusations do not only allow us to rethink the otherwise productive concept of Orientalism in more provisional terms, it also seems that the one alternative he investigates, i.e. that of Lawrence, displays a close correspondence to what Coetzee offers in his portrayal of the power struggle between Barton and Foe. For, although I have indicated that the original text of Robinson Crusoe resembles Orientalist discourse, Barton can be said to occupy a transitional position, which ultimately leads us to the figure of Friday. Despite her complicity she can be said to allegorically initiate a process of unsettling and subverting of the Western, male imperial discourse. Although hers cannot be made to resemble a full-fledged counter-discourse, complicit, doubtful and unresolved as it is, she is the catalyst that forcefully induces the reader to reflect on the silence of Friday. 
Allegory and Reading as Hermeneutics
It has been observed that the danger some of Coetzee’s fiction runs is that its politics fail to engage any particular historical situation, with bids naturally coming from the context of South Africa. Generally, and specifically with respect to Foe, one can say that his self-reflexive concern for the connections between language, representation and power makes it harder for one to quickly recognize how such a concern might relate to an actual state of affairs. It is thus that Dominic Head notes that “a focus for any analysis of Coetzee is how this self-reflexiveness is to be judged, given the pressing concerns of late- and now post-apartheid South Africa, which (in some quarters) are deemed to require a more obvious gesture of engagement and commitment on the part of the writer” (x). If objections concerning a lack of engagement are raised the answer to them simply must be that Coetzee in this novel does not wish to be all that specific but rather opted for more generally circumscribing observations on otherness in the face of the traditional, institutional voices of the West. General circumscription should not be understood as any easy outline but rather as implicating the very problematics of narrowly figuring otherness. And although Age of Iron, for instance, does clearly situate itself in the South Africa of the 1980s, it still displays a major concern, through the point of view of its white female protagonist, with the difficulties, if not impossibility, of commenting upon township unrest and school boycotts (Head 131). One may likewise think of Disgrace, which does explicitly comment upon the recent situation in Africa. I will have something to say about this at a later stage.
In any case, Coetzee, in one of a series of interviews conducted by David Attwell does state his belief in the possibility of endowing people or characters and places with allegorical meaning. While talking about his essay on Kafka he briefly touches upon the allusiveness of the letter K in Life and Times of Michael K: “There is no monopoly on the letter K; or, to put it in another way, it is as much possible to center the universe on the town of Prince Albert in the Cape Province as on Prague ... Being an out-of-work gardener in Africa in the late twentieth century is no less, but also no more, central a fate than being a clerk in Hapsburg Central Europe” (Coetzee, Doubling the Point 199).  
Indeed, I would not be surprised if Coetzee has meant for Foe to be read as an allegory. Fredric Jameson caused a major upheaval when he states that “All third-world texts are necessarily, I want to argue, allegorical, …, they are to be read as what I will call national allegories, …, particularly when their forms develop out of predominantly western machineries of representation, such as the novel” (Jameson 69). The problem with respect to Foe is that the typically western ways of representation are simply not executed when it comes to the story of Friday. From this viewpoint, therefore, it is not possible to say with any certainty that Friday’s is the predicament of any and all embattled ethnic others.
In any case, I think that Coetzee’s concise style, its brevity, with which, within a relatively small number of pages, he manages to convey an astonishing amount of allusions, showcases a self-reflexive mastery over language precisely in order to demonstrate both this allusive magnitude as well as the limits of narrative language. Of course, Coetzee’s style here also reflects his interest in the eighteenth-century prose of Daniel Defoe. However, although my aim is not to dissect the stylistic features of Foe, its incisiveness, as well as the rather high diction with which Barton and Foe debate, do seem to suggest that the novel may constitute an implicit allegory of ideas. Chiselled, precise, the conversation between the two characters sometimes takes downright theoretical turns (as when Foe brings up poetical issues or when Barton wonders why she should plead in syllogisms). Thus, in particular in the third part, we get a sense that Coetzee is pointing to broader theoretical issues behind the novel. We have already seen that we should read Foe as little less than the personification of the Western, literary mode which originates from Aristotle. Additional support for such a reading comes from the canonical standing of Daniel Defoe. I will further outline why Foe might be read as an allegory of ideas by looking in closer detail at a text by Kwaku Larbi Korang.
Korang looks to the work of Stephen Slemon to set out upon an allegorical reading: “… Foe can be made to further the important project of demystifying the canonized truths of imperialist and colonialist discourses of history. Post-colonial allegory, for Slemon, is valuable inasmuch as it destabilizes the discursively fixed ‘monuments’ of colonial history and opens up the past for ‘imaginative revision’” (185). Korang then moves on to show that what Foe exemplifies is how the white settler, when he attempts to apply European nationalist tropes in the colony, comes to suffer from a fractured consciousness. “Hence Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, as the normative and authoritative expression of the dominative logic identifying a settler-colonial society, becomes Coetzee’s failed and eccentric citation: a deliberate undoing of self, nation, and tradition in a process of narrative deconstruction” (190). Thus, for readers of Foe it is no longer possible to constitute a picture of self such as this was historically done within the trope of a “providentially revealed destiny” (190).
The traditional author function is shown to be annulled, and because Barton did not succeed in putting down her narrative, including that on Friday, Korang reads this failure as a displacement of the topos of the white man’s burden with that of the white settler’s burden. “Coetzee’s displacement of this old historicist topos reveals the projective anxieties that went into its fashioning, and he is obliged to turn its bad faith into a reflexive problematic: with the subject-object relation internalized in Foe, the divided white subject becomes herself the anxious object of a quest for self-knowledge” (191). 
Of course, the present burden is here identified, ultimately, with Coetzee, and Korang goes to great lengths to allegorically situate these problematics in present-day South Africa. But he likewise reflects it on the reader who, through the meta-fictional imagining of the problematic, possibly irresolvable contact with the historically othered figure of Friday, must of necessity remain fractured between his own obliterating history and the post-colonial present. 
Friday
“On the sorrows of Friday, I once thought to tell Mr. Foe, but did not, a story entire of itself might be built; whereas from the indifference of Cruso there is little to be squeezed” (Foe 87). This line may be read as a premiss, held to be true, which cannot be investigated or resolved. Indeed, it may prove to be the central remark on Friday’s predicament. Along this line also consider: “The true story will not be heard till by art we have found a means of giving voice to Friday” (118). Apart from the fact that Barton may here be referring, not just to Friday’s story, but to her own and, by extension, that of Cruso, this sentence reminds one of the problem that Spivak warns against when investigating the subaltern other. “... what taxonomy can fix (such a space) ... the specific nature of the degree of deviation of (the dominant indigenous groups at the regional and local level) from the ideal (the subaltern) and situate it historically” (qtd. in Ashcroft et al. 218). What this problem comes down to is the question: what is the self of otherness? This question can perhaps not be answered, if we are to believe Macleod, for he calls for “idiosyncratic terms” (14). 
In this light, it is useful to look back to one typically colonial response when confronted with the other. Elleke Boehmer describes how ‘the other’ remains peculiarly absent from colonialist writing, which literature she defines, broadly speaking, as holding, or only just unwittingly supporting the imperialist’s view. Many motifs found in the (literary) articulation of this view, even when found in documents of administration or state, law, et cetera, motifs such as the masculinity of the colonizer, were defined in contrast to the native, alien or other (Boehmer 78). Nevertheless, his presence shimmers through imperial narrative, for instance, as stupefied, drudged, numb presence, worn out and made indifferent by colonial control. The function of Friday can thus be said to embody this role that the colonized was pushed into. For purposes of plot, for instance, one secondary function of the character of Barton might be said to be to allow Friday to tag on to her, as it were. While she speaks, Friday can remain silent while at the same time looming over Barton’s story, explicating his silence.
Indeed, many of Barton’s responses to Friday do seem to reflect her view of Friday as a stupefied and numbed presence. She finds him to be a “shadowy creature” (24), and like a dumb beast (32) and “a poor simpleton” (39). But she also, in the citations above (on recounting Friday’s story), as elsewhere in the novel, shows herself to feel a certain obligation to make Friday speak. It is well known that bids for the acquisition of voice often come from the post-colonial West, that is, it is a typically post-colonial concern. But we likewise know that Barton does not succeed. Her attempts to make Friday speak all run aground. To some this even indicates Coetzee’s own refusal to “write for Friday” (Head 128). Nowhere, in any case, can Barton be sure that he understands her and, when Friday of his own accord does scribble and write (the “walking eyes” and the letter o, for instance, it is likewise unsure what he means (Foe 147, 151). When Barton wants to show the slate with the drawing of the walking eyes to Foe, Friday prevents this, wiping the slate clean in what is often read as an act of defiance. To Spivak, for instance, Friday here shows himself to be “the guardian of the margin” (189). Of course, Macleod’s supposition that Friday does possess a tongue and hence the capacity for speech leads him to posit a wilful silence on his part, an act of “rivalry” (14). What is important is that both these readings centre around a notion of unwillingness, an unwillingness to speak and write and, by extension, an unwillingness to live inside another’s discourse. Because of the resulting resemblance of such readings I propose to look at yet another similar reading of Friday, this time in closer detail. 
First, consider Spivak:

Yet it is Friday rather than Susan who is the unemphatic agent of withholding in the text. For every territorial space that is value coded by colonialism and every command of metropolitan anticolonialism for the native to yield his “voice,” there is a space of withholding, marked by a secret that may not be a secret but cannot be unlocked. “The native,” whatever that might mean, is not only a victim, but also an agent. The curious guardian at the margin who will not inform. (Spivak 190)

Michael Marais has offered a reading of Friday in his article “The Hermeneutics of Empire: Coetzee’s Post-colonial Metafiction.” He departs from a structuralist viewpoint in order to point to the “conflation of the acts of writing and imperialism” in Coetzee’s oeuvre, which acts he calls hermeneutic (68). That is to say that the colonizer interprets the landscape (as well as the native or the other) of the colony in a writerly, or ‘author-itarian’, fashion. This hermeneutic act is a matter of “recuperation” or recognition, which retrieval is made possible by a (necessary) dependency upon the “significatory matrix of the imperium” (68). The underlying, structuralist assumption is that of the colonial subject who is competent in his or her given culture, which, in this case, we would call imperial culture. The imperialist brings his own signifying system to the colonial scene, consisting of “inherited interpretive paradigms,” and forces its structure upon it (70). Marais thus identifies an analogy, which has as its common denominator hermeneutic creation with on either side the author and the imperialist. In Foe he therefore sees Cruso’s building of terraces on the island as “a form of metaphoric authorship: Cruso rewrites the alien terrain of the island and, in so doing, restructures this space of otherness in line with the familiar landscape of England” (68). Although the analogy fits in light of Barton’s own comparison between her authorial efforts and those of Cruso on the island, I would like to add that Cruso’s labour is meant to appear fruitless and, perhaps even, obsolete, rather like in Disgrace David Lurie feels that the English language has become an “unfit medium for the truth of South Africa,” of which I will have more to say at a later instance (Disgrace 117). Barton, for one, feels Cruso’s labour is basically stupid, a “foolish kind of agriculture” (Foe 34). Additional support for the obsoleteness of imperial hermeneutics is to be found elsewhere in Coetzee’s novels where certain structural (and narrative) principles appear to be insufficient or even to have become irrelevant (See my remarks on Disgrace and Age of Iron below). Marais touches upon some of these as well, for instance when he notes that “it is therefore fitting that in Life & Times of Michael K, which deals with a future period of decolonisation, these signs of settlement are shown to be undergoing a process of erasure: the South African Landscape in the novel is marked by abandoned farms and homesteads. … Its ultimate fate is prefigured by the erasure of these signs of settlement...” (78). Likewise in Foe Cruso’s structural efforts of organising and inscribing the island will ultimately be undone by the wear and tear of the elements and of time. It is therefore fitting that Marais often refers to Coetzee’s writing on South-African landscape poetry about which he (i.e. Coetzee) has said that “the real Africa will always slip through the net woven by European categories” (79). 
In the case of Friday Marais’ structuralist reading of some of the metaphors in Coetzee’s fiction as representing how “the colonised is rewritten in terms of a particular master code” and is “codified by European ideology” (70), leads to key passages in Foe where Barton asserts, for instance, that: “Friday has no command of words and therefore no defence against being re-shaped day by day in conformity with the desires of others. I say he is a cannibal and he becomes a cannibal … what he is to the world is what I make of him” (Foe 121-122). However, immediately annulling her previous statement, Barton also acknowledges that Friday is “neither cannibal nor laundryman, these are mere names, they do not touch his essence, he is a substantial body, he is himself, Friday is Friday” (Foe 122). This converse statement gives Marais occasion to interpret the metaphoric quality of Friday’s silence as an act of political defiance in face of the imperialist desire to read and write the other on his own (ideological and cultural) terms. He feels that, for Coetzee, silence endows the colonial subject with power, as indeed, logically speaking it does, for the selfhood of the other remains preserved simply by virtue of its remaining undiscovered. Moving quite beyond this mechanical reading and borrowing terminology from Gayatri Spivak (see citation above), Marais labels silence as the marker of a space of withholding. In this case, both critics see silence as a means of safeguarding, thereby complicating the prevalent post-colonialist theoretical assumption, from which one would rather propose the anti-colonial imperative that the other obtains a voice. For the present discussion, however, we can leave aside what it is that is thus locked away, for what is important is how this reading makes the reader reflect (back) on the imperialist’s hermeneutic urge to fix the other within his own discursive framework. 
I would say, then, that Marais is too assertive when he states that silence is “a counter-strategy through which the other preserves, even asserts, its alterior status and in so doing interrogates the fixity of dominant power structures and positions” (75). Leaving aside his reading of Michael K’s “stony” silence, Friday’s silence surely seems to be less defiant than that. Friday does not, in any sense, actively interrogate and only implicitly asserts his difference. It is the imperialist as well as ‘we’, the reader, who are left to wonder at this silence. It is important to remember that we are talking about, potentially, a particular form of social engagement, a drive for communication, however one-sided, which social bond is frustrated. Of course, imperialist discourse at all times threatens to reify the other, labelling Friday a cannibal for instance, and thereby making him all but inhuman. But at the precise moment of silence change becomes possible and the actual subject position becomes important. For it is then that the imperialist hermeneutic subject is confronted with a wall of silence that may echo his words back to him. The imperialist subject may then become aware of two facts: that his strategy does not work and that the silent other apparently does not wish it to work. If this self-reflexive interval on the part of the imperialist does not occur all that remains is either violence or retreat. Again, in the history of imperialism both actual and discursive violence were the ‘preferred option’, and, as we have seen, the theme of discursive power and violence has been well documented. But it is also important to remember that here we are on the level of the text which makes the possibility of a self-reflexive interval on the part of the imperialist subject more viable. In other words, if we want to come to a full reading of discursive encounters with silence a self-reflective quality should be seen as emanating from that silence. This is quite a different thing from saying that the silent other ‘does’ the interrogating. To consider the possibility of a self-reflexive moment on the part of the imperialist is especially viable, then, because we are here dealing with self-reflexive fiction and, in a different way, Marais concedes the same. Although I have said that he is too forward about the political potential of the silent stance, he does point out that Coetzee aims to confront the reader with the imperialist hermeneutic activities which he represents in his novels. The reader “is forced to do so by metafictional strategies of identification which extend the self-other dialectic informing the relation of oppressor and oppressed to the level of interpretation. As a consequence, the act of reading Coetzee’s novels becomes a political allegory of the capture and containment of colonial space” (81). 
What I am trying to argue is that interpretations of (fictional) encounters with silent others should be read in a separate, twofold way. One the one hand silence raises the question of the margin and of what lies beyond. As Spivak has pointed out, because the subject is of necessity in the dark about this beyond, we must conclude that the revelation of any possible disclosure is “singular.” However, this also means that we cannot know what motivates an ‘act’ of silence. Encounters with silence, therefore, cannot so readily be read as political on the part of the colonized. Acts of silence have little to do with questioning or interrogation but rather with, at best, resistance or restraint.  
On the other hand, what encounters with silence do invariably bring about, if we for a moment ignore the option of violence, is a turn inwards, and leave as the only option, self-interrogation. In Foe, the outcome of the silent encounter remains unresolved, leaving the hermeneutic acts of reading and writing in a state of suspension. Consider the facts. Barton’s ‘story’ is never set to rights. It is, in fact, highly questionable what that might mean, and what, then, might have substantiated her story. We further acknowledge the possibility of hermeneutic violence ( “I say he is a cannibal and he becomes a cannibal.”), but like Barton’s story, this violence is never fully effected. And when we finally visit the home of Friday we are told that “this is not a place of words” (157). We must conclude that, within the scheme of this novel, we can neither read nor write Friday.
Now, before I proceed, I wish to stress that I am aware of the dangers of both the nihilism of my reading, not reading Friday in any definite sense, as well as that of promoting a new dichotomy. After all, I am completely separating Friday from the discourse of Barton and Foe, leaving him where he is. I am basically saying that the reader is invited to go back to his or her own history and think it through again. I therefore think that what Coetzee is saying is that we can neither read nor write Friday in any traditional way. But he conversely says that we should try. For the narrator of the fourth part is shown to fumble for words as it were, when twice (s)he tries to find a way into Friday’s mouth. (S)he hears the sounds of the island and, secondly, finds a “slow stream” coming out of his mouth, enveloping the earth (Foe 154, 157). In the end, Friday’s voice is merely figured, in a self-conscious act of imagination, unsettling and suspending the novel as a whole.
Further Reading: Age of Iron and Disgrace
In Disgrace one finds what is perhaps also an expression of the impossibility of recounting the story of the other or subaltern, in this case embodied by Petrus. He is a black man living on the farm of the narrator’s daughter Lucy. In this novel the respective roles of each character shift as the narrative progresses. Although the central relationship is that between the narrator, David Lurie, and his daughter, the strains between them are reflected in the ascendancy of Petrus from ‘servant’ to ‘master’. While the protagonist, David Lurie, comes to terms with old age, losing his professional position, his ‘sexual relevance’ and failing largely in making up for his failures as a father to Lucy, Petrus, in the background, is untouched by the slow crisis evolving on the farm. The constant threat of the natives, reflected also, for instance, in the promise of the demise of the neighbour farmer Ettinger, and the de facto immunity of David and Lucy’s attackers, finds its inevitable result in Petrus’ consolidation as master of the farm, taking Lucy as his tenant, and possibly his third wife or concubine. Thus it is he who will protect Lucy. But it is unlikely that Lurie will ever hear the full story:

Petrus is a man of his generation. Doubtless Petrus has been through a lot, doubtless he has a story to tell. He would not mind hearing Petrus’s story one day. But preferably not reduced to English. More and more he is convinced that English is an unfit medium for the truth of South Africa. Stretches of English code whole sentences long have thickened, lost their articulations, their articulateness, their articulatedness. Like a dinosaur expiring and settling in the mud, the language has stiffened. Pressed into the mould of English, Petrus’s story would come out arthritic, bygone. (Disgrace 117)

What this passage also hints at is that stories like that of Lurie are no longer prevalent in South Africa, and are in fact moving towards irrelevance or mingle in, in an appropriative sense (as in the case of the possible future of Lucy as Petrus’ wife). It, Lurie’s story, is rather, perhaps, one of the closing chapters of the master narrative of a people who live in a country that is no longer for them, rather like a species that can no longer adapt to its surroundings. The new situation impels them to send off their children, back to the ‘home’ they came from, in this case, Holland. This double sense of the aging process of Lurie is reflected in the state of Africa, which, in this novel, almost indifferently and sometimes outright violently expels the whites. 
It is no coincidence, then, that Marais, as I have already pointed out, identifies similar patterns and processes in Coetzee’s work, which seem to lead to a state wherein Western, and, though perhaps less so in the case of Disgrace, imperialist author-itarian perceptions of the colonial landscape and the other are no longer relevant. I am thinking here of his reading of Cruso’s building of terraces on the island as a metaphor for inscribing the colonial landscape along the hermeneutic lines of imperialism. To this reading I have added that this activity was rather meant to appear fruitless. Although Marais’ analogy, that is, that between Cruso´s agriculture and an author-itarian hermeneutic structuring of the alien landscape, does hold, Barton stresses the stupidity of it all, with Cruso cultivating the land for seed that will never be sowed. And when she wonders how Cruso himself sees this, she hints at a reversal, quite the opposite of the original Robinson Crusoe’s organization of his island: “I believe your master would have had it be a garden of labour; but, lacking a worthy object for his labours, descended to carrying stones, as ants carry grains of sand to and fro for want of a better occupation” (Foe 86). As Cruso is said to revert to insignificant labour, he may be seen to descend out of the equation while Barton attempts to appropriate his story within that of her own. Coetzee thus seems to hint at a transitional period that is characterized by the slow expiration of imperialist discourse as a structurally constitutive force. Although researchers of ‘neo-colonialism’ would perhaps beg to differ as to whether such a transition will actually come to fully run its course, it is quite clearly a logical prospect once the imperialist master narratives of colonial space and the colonial other have, theoretically at least, successfully been contested.       
Not coincidentally then, notions of transition and expiration can be found in Age of Iron as well. The dinosaur image from Disgrace is clearly reminiscent of some of the images that permeate the text of Age of Iron. The most immediate of these occurs when Mrs. Curren, thinking back to a burglary and the consequent decision to have bars put before the windows, compares herself to an expiring dodo: “the last of the dodos, old, past egg-laying” (Age of Iron 28). Mrs. Curren is dying from cancer and writing a long, last letter to her daughter, who emigrated to the United States. When Mrs. Curren reminisces on their last goodbye at the airport, with her daughter decisively shaking the dust off her shoes, forcefully severing herself from the last of the South African soil, and declaring: “Do not call me back, Mother ... because I will not come,” Mrs. Curren feels her daughter is in the right (139). She sees no future for her daughter in her country of birth, and as she thinks of her lineage in all but organic terms, the umbilical connection directs itself inevitably out of South Africa when she thinks of herself as one of the “children of that bygone age” (92). Again, as does Disgrace, Age of Iron holds the promise of a repossession of the land by “the rising generation,” represented by the combative youngster Bheki and his friend John (81). 
Furthermore, on one self-conscious level of the text we see this thematics of a move towards irrelevance equated to that of the expiration of a whole tradition and discourse. Derek Attridge notes how, like Foe and, through the logic of discursive complicity, Barton, Mrs. Curren, too, embodies a literary and cultural tradition: “And the language remains highly deliberate and self-aware, consciously fashioned out of the culture’s inheritance rather than pretending to immediacy and originality; as a professor of classics Mrs. Curren stands for the whole Western inheritance from Greece and Rome, its ethical and political language rendered suspect even as it forms into telling moral apothegms” (Attridge, Literary Form 207).
Thus, the process of dying is closely paralleled to the growing irrelevance of the white settler’s language. The theme of the expiration of a complete generation and the age it represents can therefore be seen to essentially play itself out on a discursive level. The language, or propaganda, of the South African government, for instance, has a stupefying effect on Mrs. Curren. Aggravated though she is, she still allows such a message to reach her through the television, but it benumbs and deadens her; it is “a message that turns people to stone” (Age of Iron 29). The Republican South African discourse, it seems, has deprived her of the right, the possibility even, of critical speech. She can merely record the effects of this language, in turn writing it out of South Africa, at the same time as it becomes obsolete.
Conclusion
It is important to point out that I am in agreement with Macleod’s reading of Foe itself when it comes to interpreting the characters of Barton and Friday. But I do not agree that what I have called Barton’s discursive complicity, has been grossly overlooked by most critics. What I have tried to do, therefore, through lengthy discussions of the antagonism between Barton and Foe, some of Said’s work and essays like that of Marais, is foreground the narrative dimension of this novel, such in accordance with Macleod. It was then possible to show that many critics equally accord the discursive dimension of Coetzee’s novel a foundational importance. Furthermore, pretty much all of the essays discussed here use this foundational thematics to show, at the very least, that it is the common cause for nearly all of the problems Barton experiences. Her desire to come alive and acquire substance within the narrative and, by extension, traditionally discursive frameworks that Foe stipulates and represents, make her complicity inevitable. Sue Kossew’s essay on the first three of Coetzee’s women narrators is a clear case in point. With regard to the presumed tonguelessness of Friday it is necessary to return once more to some of Macleod’s arguments.  
Macleod’s uses terminology from Thomas Pavel’s Fictional Worlds to stress that the ‘fact’ of Friday’s tonguelessness has become ontologically self-sufficient; that it has, in other words, crossed the boundary between the fictional and the real and is now taken for a fact. Furthermore, Macleod argues, Coetzee has meant for this fiction to cross for it is yet another level at which he wishes to demonstrate the discursive compulsion of fictional narratives to lull its readers into conceited belief. This is the fundamental reason why the stress is on narrative skill and the question of what substantiates stories and, more importantly, its characters. Using Lyotard’s notion of the grand narrative to explain why critics have been tempted into misreading Friday’s body, Macleod centres on narrative skill because it is a vital means to get on in the world. He considers the following statement of Barton, “we will never make our fortunes, Friday, by being merely what we are, or were.” (Foe 82), to comment: “Fortune and success aren’t the stuff of any kind of straightforward identity, but of false coherence discursive frameworks can provide; being ‘merely what we are’ is less important than fitting into a recognizable grand narrative” (Macleod 9). Statements like these undermine Barton’s personal ethic to be able to “swear to the truth of her tale” (40).
Macleod also asserts “Susan believes that, without ‘a bridge of words’ Friday has ceased to exist in the ‘ordinary world’ in which ‘other people live’ (Foe 60), but, again, such a view depends on the assumption of his mutilated helplessness” (12). But, again, quite a few critics explore the possibility of reading Friday’s silence in an active sense (Spivak 190, Marais 74 – 75). They see him as defying the discourse of Foe and as a further illustration of the trap Barton falls into. For these critics’ readings, it seems, it would simply not have mattered all that much whether or not they would have conceded that Friday does possess a tongue.
As I have argued, the impossibility of taking up Friday as a character more or less substantiated by the kind of text that Barton has in mind should lead us to conclude that we can neither write nor read Friday; that, in fact, we should fall back to our own historically determined subject position to recognize this, our own inability. In my view, then, the novel does not go quite beyond this but, given the sheer indeterminable nature of the fourth section, merely prefigures the “singular” territory that lies ahead. 
Of course, such a view simply foregoes the disputation over Friday’s mutilation that Macleod has initiated. But perhaps we should remember that this is a novel that was written at a time when post-colonial theory was not nearly nascent, the first half of the 1980s; a time when, in the Western academy, a poststructuralist ethos was still very relevant. This has lead some of the critics, writing during the nineties, to call for a theoretical practice which consciously keeps itself in a state of suspension. To determine, that is, only provisionally with the professed resolution to both return and move forward. It is in this spirit that Korang subscribes to the task at hand: “I understand the “post” in this sense to refer a post-colonial practise beyond itself, leaving a space beyond its definitional moment for a catching up with itself, and establishing its valency by way of a trajectory of continual rehearsals that make self-improvement both thinkable and possible” (180). It seems to me that such an ethos can be but the logical outcome of imaginings such as those one finds in Coetzee’s Foe.
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^1	  This fact belongs more to similar occurrences of, or allusions to, historical facts pertaining to Robinson Crusoe, such as this novel being a response to an ascendant publishing market. I will touch upon such facts at a later stage.
^2	  Frank Ellis points out that in fact there are a number of accounts of Selkirk’s adventure: “But there are three written accounts of Selkirk’s experiences and it seems likely that Defoe read them.” (Ellis, Introduction 4)
^3	  The circumstantiality of Cook’s reports Ellis adds only as an afterthought, for naturally he is more concerned with the symbolic and intertextual importance of eighteenth-century discourses on cannibalism: “It is, however, significant that all the Cook’s reports (sic), despite their ubiquity, remain either circumstantial, second-hand or dramatic. Recent ethnographic and archaeological research seems to indicate that it is doubtful that the pre-European Maori were consistently cannibal for either subsistence or cultural reasons” (58). 
^4	  Famous aphorism by the German-American architect Ludwig Mies van der Rohe (1886-1969).
^5	  Indeed, as can be seen elsewhere in the novel, the early eighteenth-century meaning of ‘to hint’ seems also to have been ‘to say’: “I went up the creek first, where, as I hinted, I brought my rafts on shore” (Robinson Crusoe 79).
^6	  Such one may want to deduce from a statement like this: “…as far as I have been able to determine, all critics of Foe operate under some assumption that Friday is the subject of some radical mutilation…” (Macleod 7).
^7	  Porter investigates only this possibility but also points out that “directly counter-hegemonic writings or an alternative canon may exist within a Western tradition,” and, secondly, asserts “the feasibility of a textual dialogue between Western and non-Western cultures” (153).
^8	  As a British army officer Lawrence’s protagonist serves the common cause of the Anglo-French and Arab nationalist army against the domination of the Ottoman Empire. The Turks, allies of the Germans, are opposed in order to retain control over the Suez Canal but the protagonist, in participating in the Arab nationalist revolt, finds “how from the beginning his loyalties were divided” (Porter 156).    
